Gettysburg: July 1st to 3rd, 1863
Gettysburg ranks with the battles that have decided the fate of empires. Had the issue been different the cause of the Confederacy would no doubt have triumphed and the United States have been split in twain. It was fought when the fortunes of the South were at their highest point. Recent victories at Frederick and Chancellors Ville had greatly raised the morale. Their army had been recruited and was re-organised under efficient and much trusted commanders; they were in the position to carry the war into the enemy’s country, to invade the States still faithful to the Union, and threaten the Central Government at Washington. On the other hand, the Federals were weakened and dispirited. The withdrawal of many short-service men had greatly reduced their strength, and they had been but lately twice defeated in the open field. Had the Confederates won at Gettysburg, nothing could well have prevented their occupation of Pennsylvania and Maryland. Other far reaching consequences all tending to the success of the rebellion was more than probable.
It was the famous General Robert E. Lee, at that time the Confederate general-in-chief, who planned the operations that ended in the battle of Gettysburg. Whatever his ultimate aims, no doubt his immediate object was the defence or Richmond, the Southern capital, by an offensive counter attack. His advance was a wide outflanking movement, a blow boldly and unexpectedly struck so far to the rear that the Federals must at once fall back. Thus Richmond would be immediately relieved, while other decisive results would in all probability follow.
A word or two first about Lee, that fine soldier whom his foes compared to Napoleon, declaring that his presence on the field was worth 20,000 men to his side. He was of noble character, a simple, straightforward soldier, devout and God-fearing, a true patriot, prepared to give his life for his country, great in every situation, under every condition, unspoilt by success, unshaken by adversity. “A large austere man,” Ulysses Grant called him, and he was no doubt clothed with natural dignity that was most impressive; but he had still a keen sense of humour, and ruled by quiet sarcasm as much as by force and severity. One good story is told of his rebuke to Mr. Hill, the newspaper editor who freely found fault with one of his campaigns. “We made a great mistake, Mr. Hill, at the beginning of the war,” he said, “and that was in appointing our best generals to edit newspapers and our worst to command the armies in the field. For myself, I have done my best, but I shall be happy to change places with you if you can do better.”
Another story shows him in the finest light, his large-minded chivalry and unstinting kindliness of heart. It was after this very battle of Gettysburg about to be described, at which he was defeated, as we shall see. When he had ordered a general retreat and was passing rapidly to the rear, he came close to where a wounded Union soldier lay upon the ground with a shattered leg. The poor fellow, with a fine bravado that no one can condemn, raised himself up at recognising the enemy’s general and shouted “Hurrah for the Union!” full in Lee’s face. Then Lee-but let the veteran tell his own story. “The General heard me, looked, stopped his horse, dismounted and came towards me. I confess that I at first thought he meant to kill me. But as he came up he looked down at me with such a sad expression on his face that all fear left me and I wondered what he was about. He extended his hand to me, and grasping mine firmly and looking right into my eyes he said, ‘My son, I hope you will soon be well.’ If I live a thousand years I shall never forget the expression on General Lee’s face. There he was, defeated, retiring from a field that had cost him and his cause almost their last hope, and yet he stopped to say words like these to a wounded soldier of the opposition, who had taunted him as he passed by. As soon as the general had left me I cried myself to sleep, there upon the bloody ground.”
No wonder that “Mas’r Robert,” as he was affectionately called in the army and throughout the South, was the idol of his men. Whenever he showed himself he was greeted with that fierce yell that came to be known as the confederate battle cry. When any at a distance heard it-if there was no fighting afoot, that is to say-they knew it’s meaning, and would exclaim, “There goes Mas’r Robert, or old Stonewall Jackson, or a hunted hare.” His anxiety for his men was unbounded; his first care was for the sick and wounded. When his grateful fellow countrymen would have presented him with a house and estate, he refused, begging that the money might be distributed among the sufferers in the war. He chided his officers when they exposed themselves needlessly, and if they retorted that they only followed his example, he would say that it was his duty to be in the forefront and not their. Yet sometimes his people protested when his ardent courage carried him too far. In one of the fierce encounters in the Wilderness he rode up, resolved to lead the charge. Then the officer commanding cried, “General Lee, this is no place for you. Boys! Is it necessary for General Lee to show you the way?” “No! No!” was the ringing reply. “We will drive the enemy back if General Lee will only go to the rear.”
It is sad to turn from this splendid old man in his triumphs to the hour when he was forced to surrender the remnant of his gallant band to General Grant. Even then the affection of those he had so often led to victory was exhibited in the most touching fashion. They would have cheered him as he rode by on that same grand warhorse, Traveller, who had carried him almost uninterruptedly through the war, but the sadness of the occasion silenced all. Only “as he rode slowly along the lines hundreds of his devoted veterans pressed around their noble chief, trying to take his hand, touch his person, or even lay a hand upon his horse, thus exhibiting their great affection for him. The general then, with head bare and tears flowing his manly checks, bade adieu to the army. In a few words he told the brave men who had been so true in arms to return to their homes and become worthy citizens.
It was in June 1863, when Lee was at the zenith of his reputation that he resolved to follow up the successes already achieved against the North by an invasion of the Northern territory. The strategically operation he now adopted, and which led up to his reserve at Gettysburg, must be described here with a view to a proper appreciation of the coming battle.
At this time the Confederate forces in Virginia numbered 70,000. Opposed to them were about 80,000 Federals under General “Joe” Hooker, a comparatively weak force owing, as has been said, to the action of the short service Enlistment Act, under which many had recently left the colours. Besides these 40,000 more were in and about Washington under quasi-independent commanders, following the vicious system that then obtained, and none were available for the first line. Hooker’s army, covering Washington, was encamped on the Rappahannock River immediately opposite the lines of Fredericksburg, which at this time held by the bulk of the Confederate army.
Lee was anxious to take the offensive, both to draw Hooker away and to transfer the theatre of war beyond the Potomac. With these objects he began on the 3rd of June a rapid concentration to his left. First Longstreet’s corps, then Ewell’s were directed upon Culpepper Court House, while Hill stood fast as Fredericksburg watching Hooker. The latter was long in ignorance of his enemy’s movements, but on the 9th June he learnt through a cavalry skirmish that Lee was in a force at Culpepper. Hooker meant to follow along the river, but now Lee made a further bold leap ahead and stretched out Ewell’s corps north and west, thus thrusting his extreme left into the valley of the Shenandoah. Ewell was at Winchester on the 13th, having accomplished seventy miles from Culpepper in three days. Lee’s front now occupied at least a hundred miles. His right corps, Hill’s, was still at Fredericksburg; Longstreet with the centre was at Culpepper; the left and most advanced was at Winchester at the mouth of the Shenandoah Valley, still remembered by the Federals, from the many disasters encountered there, as the “Valley of Humiliation.”
Hooker, when he realised that Lee was thus dangerously drawn out, was for striking at once against his centre, but he was not encouraged therein by the Government in Washington, and he had no alternative but to retire and cover the capital. This realised the Confederate general Hill from Fredericksburg, and he quickly followed on to Culpepper, thus relieving Longstreet, who now marched northward, taking the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge Mountain, and pointing for Harper’s Ferry on the Potomac. Hill then slipped in behind and threatened the Shenandoah Valley in support of Ewell. Ewell knowing the others were approaching now pushed across the Potomac and invaded Pennsylvania. Longstreet and hill followed Ewell, and then the whole of this northern territory was at the mercy of the Confederate army.
At this critical moment when grave events were imminent, General Hooker fell out with his superiors and resigned his command. His conduct has been sharply criticised, but he no doubt felt that he was not a free agent, and had been subjected too much fussy interference. He was immediately replaced by General Meade, a much more practical soldier, who had made his way upward by sterling merit, who was quiet and undemonstrative but strong and self-reliant, knowing his business thoroughly. The President-Lincoln-appears to have trusted in him implicitly, and he was at once given fuller powers than Hooker had enjoyed.
Meade felt that it was incumbent upon him to come to blows with Lee as soon as possible. He guessed the enemy’s intention from the direction of his march, and hoped that by striking promptly at Lee he might turn him back and prevent him from crossing the Susquehanna River.
The Federal army had been converging on Frederick City, and had already reached it when Meade assumed the command. From Frederick he at once moved forward towards Gettysburg.
Meade had seven army corps under his orders. The first (Reynold) and eleventh (Howard) were directed on Emmetsburg; the third (Sickles) and the twelfth (Slocum) on Taneytown; the second (Hancock) on Frizzleburg; the fifth (Skyes) to Unionville, and the sixth corps (Sedgwick) to Windsor.
This was the 29th June. On that same day General Lee learnt that the Federals were on the move, and with a celerity, which they had never before displayed. Fearing for his now greatly extended communications, he desisted from his plan of invasion, and resolved to concentrate rapidly so as to be ready, if necessary, to cover his line of retreat. Accordingly he at once countermarched Ewell from York backs on Gettysburg, and diverted Longstreet and Hill from Chambersburg to the eastward, also on Gettysburg. The opposing armies were thus rapidly approaching each other; a great battle was evidently near at hand, although no one as yet could surely forecast the exact on which it would take place.
Lee was pointing for Gettysburg because it was of supreme importance to him. Meade, who had no such strong reason, was also making for it; he had at that time no knowledge of the lie of the land there and the strong features it offered as a position to defend, but he merely threw his advance forward to seize and occupy it as a cover for a general line he meant to assume along Pipe Creek. This advanced force consisted of three army corps-the 1st, 3rd, and 11th, the whole under the command of General Reynolds of the 1st Corps. A division of cavalry, Buford’s, preceded the march of this force.
Buford seized Gettysburg on the 30th June, and pushing through it reconnoitred west and north by roads along which lee was expected. That night Lee’s advance, two divisions of Hill’s corps, having threaded the passes of the South Mountain, bivouacked within seven miles of Gettysburg; the head of Ewell’s corps was at Heidelsburg, nine miles; Longstreet’s corps and Hill’s third division were still to the westward of South Mountain. General Lee with head-quarters was with Longstreet.
On the morning of the 1st June, Buford with the Federal cavalry stood across to Chambersburg, and was attacked by Hilll about 9 a.m. Buford made good dispositions, resolving to hold the Confederates I check until he could be supported; he knew that Reynolds’s with two whole army corps was not far off, and that it was his duty to detain the enemy as long as possible. Reynolds hurried everyone forward, and soon became hotly engaged with the 1st Corps, which was the earliest and only one to reach the ground for some time. Reynolds had no orders to bring on a general action, but he knew that the bulk of his friends were still to the rear, and he was anxious to give them time to come up and form in the position south of Gettysburg. The first fight was on either side of the Chambersburg road, especially to the south along a small river called Willoughby’s Run, and here while nobly animating his men Reynolds was slain. Next Ewell’s corps, arriving from the northward, began to exert pressure on the Federal right, and a portion of the 1st Corps was moved across to meet it; presently the arrival of the 11th Corps under Howard brought further help. Howard was now the senior officer and in chief command. He fell into an error not uncommon during this war-that of attempting to cover too much ground. The result was that the long Federal line was unduly weak and drawn out with dangerous gaps at critical points. One of these was about Oak Hill, commanding ridge between the right of the 1st Corps and the left of the 11th. Rodes, with advance division of Ewell’s corps reaching towards his right to join hands with Hill, saw this opening and seized it, thus securing the key point of the Federal position. While Ewell’s other division under Early easily forced back the extreme right, Rodes, thus happily placed, broke through the centre with irresistible force, and the whole of the Federal line was broken, its several component parts retreating in great disorder towards the town of Gettysburg. So serious was the reverse that the Confederates captured 5,000 prisoners, and as many more Federal soldiers were left dead or wounded on the ground.
Meanwhile Meade had hurriedly sent General Hancock forward to assume the command and use his discretion as to the position the whole army should assume, whether it should hold Gettysburg or occupy the proposed line of Pipe Creek. Hancock’s first duty, however, was to rally the disorganised 1st and 11th corps, and, being a calm, self-reliant man whose soldierly qualities were well known to the troops, he soon restored order and established the shaken forces firmly in the new and strong position he found ready to his hand. For Hancock, with true military perception, had taken in at a glance the value of the ground just south of Gettysburg for defensive purposes. He accordingly urged the general-in-chief to occupy it at once and make it his battleground. Meade readily concurred, and moved up all the troops he had in hand to support those already in position there.
This ridge of Gettysburg-a name that will be ever famous in military history-is no doubt admirably adapted for defence. It runs due south of the town, but at a point opposite it and near it the ridge trends back to the east, thus forming a salient angle or “crotchet.” The centre is known as Cemetery Hill. To the right and east is another higher hill, Culp’s Hill, which is rough and rocky, its base washed by a stream. This hill formed the extreme right of the Federal position. South from Cemetery Hill the ridge runs strongly defined for three miles, and then ends in two peaks, rocky and wooded, the most elevated being known as “Round Top,” the lesser as “Little Round Top” Hills. The eastern slope of the position was good but gradual, affording excellent cover for reserves and trains. The western front sloped more steeply down to the valley in which runs the Emmersburg Road. On the far side is another ridge running parallel with Cemetery Ridge through part of its length; it is known as the Seminary Ridge, and was the centre of the Confederate position in the coming fights.
General Lee came upon the ground towards the close of the action, which ended in the discomfiture of the two Federal army corps. He was greatly hampered at this time for the want of cavalry, and much in the dark as to the enemy’s exact movements or intentions. The intrepid Stuart was his cavalry leader, but that famous general by an untoward manoeuvre had been quite cut off from him, and only rejoined by a wide detour on the 2nd July, his force much jaded and reduced by rapid marching. Lee, however, seems to have realised that a great battle was inevitable. He could see for himself that the Federals were collecting in front of him, and he hoped to be able to strike a blow before their concentration was complete. Military critics have disapproved of Lee’s decision to attack at this juncture. It is urged that the wiser strategy would have been to draw off and make good his retreat before he was to gravely compromise at this great distance from his base. He was not now, indeed, very anxious to take the offensive unless his enemy gave him an advantage by some false move. But to surrender the invasion, to have recrossed the Potomac without an action, would have been humiliating, for the Confederates were at this time in the ascendant. They had been so uniformly successful in late engagements that to retire now would have meant a terrible loss of prestige. Besides they had always won hitherto; why not again? “There was not a barefoot soldier in tattered grey” among the Confederates who did not firmly believe then that Lee would certainly lead them to victory whenever he chose.
The Second Day’s Battle
By the early morning of the 2nd July the opposing armies were gathered together around Gettysburg. All the Federal army corps, expect Sedgwick’s had come up, and were thus disposed: -
1) Slocum with the 12th Corps held Culp’s Hill on the extreme right.
2) Howard with the 11th Corps was posted at Cemetery Hill in the centre.
3) Hancock and the 2nd Corps came next along the southern ridge and then joined Sickles with the 3rd Corps on the left.
4) The 5th Corps, under Sykes, was held in reserve at first behind the right, and later behind the left.
On 1st July it was some twenty-three miles to the rear, but it came up after a rapid night march. Sedgwick and the 6th corps was still further off-at Manchester, thirty-six miles distant; but he hurried forward, and covering the whole ground in twenty hours reached the field at 2 p.m. on this the 2nd July.
The Confederates were in positions as follows: -
1) Ewell’s corps occupied the town of Gettysburg and the ground in between it and Rock Creek. He held thus the left of Lee’s line, and was opposed, naturally, to Culp’s Hill, the Federal right.
2) Hill’s corps was posted along the Seminary Ridge, which, as already described, fronted the Cemetery Ridge and centre of the Federal line.
3) Longstreet’s corps had bivouacked four miles to the rear, but he was to circle round, take the right of the Confederates, and open the ball by an attack on the Federal left.
General Lee greatly hoped, as has been said, to commence the action before his opponents gathered up all their strength. An early reconnaissance made of the Cemetery Ridge encouraged this view, and decided him to throw his weight on the left of the enemy’s line. He would have been all the more eager for this had he realised then that what came out later-namely, that the two Round Top Hills on the Federal left were the keys of the position, and the Confederates, if lodged there, would have taken the whole length of the Cemetery Ridge in reverse. Longstreet, unfortunately, was too slow. That general could easily have covered the four miles that separated him from the battlefield in less than a couple of hours, but he waited and waited for one laggard brigade, a comparatively small body, until the day was nearly spent, and he did not commence his attack till 4 p.m. By this time the whole of the Federal forces had reached their ground.
Now when the hour of impact had arrived the Federal General Sickles gave the first chance to the Confederates. His post with the 3rd Corps was on the left extremity of the Cemetery Ridge, but short of the Round Top Hills. Seeing in front of another crests some 500 yards distant and carrying the Emmetsburg road, he pushed forward and occupied it. He thus left a strong position for another, weaker, out of the line of the battle. Lee, who ordered Longstreet to make his first attack on Sickles’s centre, seized upon this mistake. It was done; while Hood, of Longstreet’s corps, circled round, penetrated the right, and was within an ace of securing the Little Round Top. The crucial importance of this hill was very manifest to a Federal general of engineers, who was passing and who forthwith ordered up a brigade of Syke’s 5th Corps to hold it. A race between Federals and Confederates for the Little Round Top followed, not unlike that of the English and French as Salamanca for the Arapiles Hills. The Combatants joined issue and the prize was hotly contested steel to steel, but it was in the end retained by the blue-coated Federals and the battle saved. Meanwhile, Sickles was hardly pressed in the centre and had to be continually reinforced, first by Hancock’s corps, and then by those of Sykes and Slocum, the last named being brought up by Meade in person. In the end the Confederates gained the advanced ground taken up by Sickles, and it seemed a very substantial triumph. But this was not a part of the real position on Cemetery Ridge, and Lee overestimated its importance. Culp’s Hill had achieved a much greater gain on the far right.
The plan of the Confederate battle had been to throw the chief burthen of attack upon Longstreet. But Ewell on the other, or extreme left opposite the Federal right, was to make a vigorous demonstration against Culp hill so as to occupy the Federals on this side and keep back reinforcements from the threatened left. Ewell delayed his movement till near sunset, and thus failed in his object of retaining the whole of the 11th and 12th Corps in front of him. But this told in his favour. So great had been the drain upon the Federal right to reinforce their endangered left that when Ewell advanced he boldly resolved to change demonstration into attack, and one of his divisions, Early’s, all but captured Cemetery Hill. His second division, Johnson’s, was sent up against Culp’s Hill, where only a single brigade remained in position, and although it held out, bravely seconded by detachments from Wadworth’s division, the earthworks on Culp’s Hill were carried and held by the Confederates all through that night. Their possession of this point jeopardised the whole Federal line, and rendered it practically untenable.
So at nightfall on this the Second day’s fighting, the advantage appeared to be with the Confederates. Longstreet had carried all before him, and Ewell was firmly established within the Federal line. There was much, therefore, to justify Lee in renewing the battle on the following day. Yet Meade was not disheartened. His losses had been terrible, already amounting to more than 20,000 men. But he was certain that his foes had also suffered most severely; he felt that his position, save at Culp’s Hill, was intact, and he was strongly supported by the confidence with which his corps commanders declared that they could recover lost ground and hold their own the following day.
The Third Days Battle
Le had resolved to follow up his success at Culp’s Hill, and to maintain at all costs and against all comers the foothold made by Johnson. But the Federal general was equally determined to turn him out, and during the night collected powerful field batteries, which at daybreak opened a fierce fire upon the captured breastwork. Then two whole divisions of the 12th Corps and a fresh brigade of the 6th were sent by Meade to recover it. For four long hours the struggle went on until at last the hill was wrested from the Confederates, and the Federal line on this side was once more made secure.
Lee thereupon changed his plan and determined to attack the left centre of the Federal position at a point where the ridge was easier and the Emmetsburg road led through a depression. To prepare for this attack he massed his whole artillery on the Seminary Ridge, and by noon on the 3rd, 145 guns, all field-batteries, were in position. The Federals had not been idle meanwhile. They had gathered together eighty guns to reply to the enemy’s cannonade, which commenced at 1 p.m., and is described by General Hancock as the most terrific he ever witnessed, “the most prolonged, one possibly hardly ever paralleled.” This fearful artillery duel lasted for a couple of hours, when the fire of the Confederates gradually slackened as ammunitionran short, and that of the Federals was reserved to be directed with more crushing effect upon the attacking column.
The proud but perilous privilege of leading this attack was entrusted to Pickett’s division of Longstreet’s corps, which had only arrived upo the ground that morning, and was therefore fresh and not battle-torn. Pickett was to be supported by a division on the left (Pettigrew’s) and a brigade (Wilcox’s) on the right. It has since been declared that Lee intended Longstreet’s two other divisions and a division of Hill’s corps to take part in the attack, and it seems upon the face of it improbable that out of nine divisions Lee would have left two alone to carry out a momentous operation on which his fate and fortunes entirely depended. However, Pickett advanced 15,000strong, crossing almost a mile of open “in such compact and imposing order that whether friend or foe, none who saw it could refrain whether friend or foe, none who saw it could refrain from admiration of its magnificent array.” These splendid veterans of Virginia were soon shattered and decimated by such terrible artillery and musketry fire that the supporting columns paused abashed and left Pickett’s men to attack single-handed. Undismayed, undeterred, they still pressed onward, and with one last heroic rushed they crowned the heights, burst in upon the defenders, and were for a time victorious. But now the Federals, recovering, rushed in on all sides, the fire of all the neighbouring guns was directed on Pickett’s division, a portion of a Vermont brigade assailed its right flank. For some time it maintained the unequal contest, but then the Confederates, “seeing themselves in a desperate strait, flung themselves on the ground to escape the hot fire, and threw up their hands in token of surrender, while the remnant sought safety in flight.” Pettigrew’s division had essayed to attack, but had been soon discomfited. Wilcox’s brigade came on after Pickett’s failure, but was soon driven back. Longstreet’s division did not move.
The battle had now been lost and won Whether or not the Federal general might have made its victory more complete by counter-attack was much discussed at the time. The repulse of the Confederates might, it is thought, have been converted into absolute rout had Meade unleashed his legions and sent them out against the beaten Confederates. But his troops were mostly wearied; he had really no reserves in hand except the few fresh men belonging to Sedgwick’s corps. Again, Lee and Longstreet both said afterwards they would have liked nothing better than to be attacked in their turn. Foreign officers with the Confederates state that it was well for the Federals that they did not attempt to follow their advantage. Colonel (now General) Fremantle of our Brigade of Guards was also present, and, although he had grave fears of the consequences of a Federal attack, he describes the Confederates as but little broken by defeat. “There was much less noise, fuss, or confusion of orders than at any ordinary field day; the men as they were rallied in the woods were brought up in detachments, and lay down quietly and coolly in the positions assigned to them.” General Longstreet long afterwards gave it as his deliberate opinion that attack would have resulted disastrously. “I had Hood’s and McLaw’s divisions, which had not been engaged; I had a heavy force of artillery; and I have no doubt I should have given those who tried as bad a reception as Pickett received,”
General Meade was, however, a cautious commander. He knew that eh had gained a great success, that Lee must now retreat, that the cause of the Confederacy had received a crushing blow from which it could never entirely recover.
The cost, too, had been terrible: of Union soldiers no fewer than 23,000 were killed or disabled in the three days, and the losses inflicted on the Confederates rose still higher to 30,000. He was too well satisfied with the achievement to risk its results by any rash adventures.
So Lee was suffered to draw off, which he did that very night, retiring westward by passes through the South Mountain range into the Cumberland valley. Severe storms impeded his march, and the tail of his columns had not quite cleared from Gettysburg till the early morning of the 5th. Then Meade pursued, but still with great circumspection. When he came up with Lee about the 12th July, he found the Confederates in the entrenched position at Williamsport on the Potomac, designed to cover the passage of that river. There is a ford at this point, and Lee’s engineers had improvised a pontoon bridge. Meade’s forces were not fully collected till the 13th, and he had resolved to attack next morning. But at daylight on the 14th the Confederates had disappeared. Lee had withdrawn his last detachments during the night “with great skill and complete success.”
They met these doughty competitors, Lee and Meade, at the very end of the campaign, just after the Confederate surrender at Richmond. Meade, who was an old comrade in happier days before the fratricidal quarrel had set them in arms against each other, went to call in a friendly way upon Lee, in the same course of a pleasant conversation. Lee turned to his visitor and said, “Meade,” the years are telling upon you; your hair is getting quite grey.” “Ah, General Lee,” was Meade’s rejoinder, “ it is not the work of years: You are responsible for my grey hairs.”
He was no doubt a dangerous antagonist. Critics have declared that, while Lee was peerless in defensive warfare, he was not so great in attack, and this judgement is perhaps borne out by the event at Gettysburg. But he attacked with great success at Chancellorsville, also at the second battle of Manassas, and he was ready enough to strike a blow whenever he saw the opportunity. He too is taxed with being now over cautious now over bold. The truth was that he adapted himself to the occasion and employed strategy and tactics according to the character of the general opposed to him. He dared much with McClellan, Pope, and Hooker; with grant he was patiently adroit and unwearied tenacious. In one respect he was unrivalled. No great soldier outvied him in the power of evoking the enthusiasm of his men. No privations, sufferings, disaster could shake their confidence in him. In the darkest hour the sight of his form or the mention of his name stirred the hearts of his veterans, and they spoke of him with affection and pride to his very last hour.
